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L Intndudion 
The last fifteen years have seen a renev.'al of interest from eoonomists in spatial issues. What sbrted as 
an attempt to re-invigorate regio.nal economics by Paul Krugman and his associates has led to a flurry 
of theoretical work, which cuhninated with the publication of Fujita, Krugman and Venables' Spatial 
Economy (1999). In tum, these theoretical developments - the 'New Economic Geography' - ha:\1-e 
triggered a wave of empirical reseaR:h and also inspired mme policy-oriented work (e.g., Baldwin, 
Forslid, Martin, Ottaviano and Robert -Niooud, 2003). 
Despite this surge in interest, several crucial issues still hinder the development of spatial economics 
and its application to a range of policy issues. First, despite some claims to the con:baty, the New 
Economic Geography (NEG) is not the tmdisputed framework of reference on alllhings spatial 
lnS!tead. it cohabits somewhat UDeaiSily with the older approach ofm:ban systems theory that builds on 
Henderson's (1974) pioneering wook There have been some attempts to reroncile these two 
furmeworl<s (Fujita, Krugman and Mori, 1999, Tabuchi, 1998) but at this poi.nt we are still missing a 
clean comparison between the two approaches . Second, despite a very large ll11.Il100r ofextensionc;., 
mmy itmportant dimensions of these models remUn. under-explored This problem is particularly acute 
from a pohcy perspective, where the most policy-relev.mt issues - imperfect labour mobility, local 
regulationc;, labour force p<nticipation etc - have attracted the least attention. Third, both urban 
systems and NEG models are very difficult to wotk v.rith and are thus still \l"efY poorly understood 
beyond their narrow circles of contributors, tvm ci.rcles which, somewhat surprisingly, do not exlnbit 
nruch overlap. Possibly as a result of these three problems, these approaches have yet to make rug 
headway in Influencing regional and m:ban policy. 
In an attempt to address these issues, this paper proposes a u.nified diagrammatic framework, which 
enCOI11p3Sses both urban systems and NEG. This diagrammatic framework helps highlight the key 
similarities and differences bet\veen the approaches and is also armnable to ·extension to give insights 
on a range of policy issues. 1be rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we :fust 
highlight the key ingredients ofany consistent theoiy of agglomeration and the a4justment ofthe 
spatial economy to shocks . We then introduce our d:iagr.umnatic framework. In seotion 3, we use it to 
compare the wban systems approach to NEG and discuss thei.r common ground and highlight their 
differences. In section 4, we show that our diagrannnatic :framew<>Jk is flexible enough to 
acoonunodate a number of existing extensions to both approaches. In section S, we apply our 
diagr<mm.la.tic :framework to a nwnber of nevir ·extensions focusing our attention, in p<nticular, on the 
Dl05t policy-relevant issues. 
Before turning to the next section, we v;rant to make it d ear that we would not advocate the wholesale 
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ceplacemmt of formal models by graphs in this, oc any, field of research. Ultimately, any fully-fledged 
unified approach to regional and m:ban ·economics wil.l have to rely on formal models_1 We only view 
our diagrammatic approach as a first step, a step that is particularly useful for the pre.li.minary 
exploration of well-articulated problems that can be very diffirult to model more formally_ In addition, 
diagrams are, of coutSe, often very efficient tools \"\-rith which to explain eoonomi.c theories to shldeots 
and policy-makers_ 
2. A diagrammatic analytical framewo•·k 
Most economic theories concerned with agglomeration and how places respond to shocks have a 
common m:lderlying struc:tufe even if this is not always appal'ent at fu5t sight Om objective is fu:st to 
identify this common structure and consider the assumptions of any consistent theoretical fuunewooc 
Any model of a spatial economy has to contain tfu:ee elements: A spatial structure, a production 
structure, and some assumptions about the mobility of goods and factOIS_ 
Spatial sfructme: Evidently, the geographical space must be divided into some number of units, 
covering cities or regions in the rol.Ultry (we \);rill call both oftbese 'areas1 _2 The nmnber of areas is 
often taken as given but in pr.rotice fuis ooed not be the case_ New areas can be created either by 
private land developeu; (as in the US) or ttnough local or central. government action (as in most oftbe 
EU). Given a selection of areas, the model must define both. an extema1 and an interml geography_ 
The external geography is about how the areas are related to each other, while the internal geography 
is concerned \vith the internal structure of the area (land. holllSing, infrastmcture etc)_ Iftbe focus is on 
linkages between places, the external geography is obviously crucial, as it V4'ill detemJine the clwmels 
tfu:ough which a change in one area. affeets others_ It is often taken to be exogenous, but this need not 
be the case as the distance between areas can change. for example as a result of changes in policy or 
technology_ A number of factors may also change the internru geography of areas_ 
Prodllcliofl stmctllre: Assumptions on the local availability of primary and inteoned.ia:te inputs play a 
crucial role_ Of the primary inputs, .most important is l.abour_1 Detailed modelling of labour is required, 
both to captur;e di:fferent skill levels and to allow for labour force participation dec-isions_ Intermediate 
inputs may also pl.ay a crucial rule_ It is possible to specify directly an aggregate production fimotion 
1 Among many reasons, we would Ull.derscore that <c-hecking the consistency of forma] models is much easier 
than that of diagrams_ F onnal models also lend themselves well to ·quantitative execcise>, v.•hich can only be 
sketched with diagrams_ 
2 Our focns is only on sub~national applications of1!hese models_ 
3 The role of land for produc-tion has receiv-ed smprisingly little attention_ H is ignored in NEG, while in the 
mban systems liteuture it plays a key role in housing. but not production 
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relating primary and intennediate inputs to some final output Often this is not very enlightening. 
Instead, assumptions about the nature of products (partirul:arly the degree of product differentiation), 
the input-output structure and the degree of fum Jevel increasing returns will determine the extent and 
mture of any aggregate mcreasin:g retmns.4 Imperl'ect competiti.on, resulting from fum level 
indivisibilities, usually lootllS large in the analysis. 
Mobility of goods a11d faclors: Assumptions about mobility, both between and within areas, play a 
crucial role in determining the spatial structure of the economy. These assumptiom should cover the 
geographical mobility of goods. services, ideas, technologies, and primary fllctOIS. The extent to which 
material inputs and outputs are tradable clearly varies across seotors. Some acfur'ities ace ' footloose' 
wblle others ace necessarily tied closely to the mrukets that they serve. The mobility of ideas and 
technologies will detemllile how the production fimction varies across space. Finally, asswnptions on 
pri:mruy factors are crucial Land is immobile, although its availability for use in different activities 
(e.g_, housing VeiSUS agriculture) is endogenous. Capital is often taken as highly mobile, with the same 
supply price in aD areas. The (imperfect) mobility of labour is a frmdamental issue that warrants 
carefultreatmmt. The conjtmction of some form of increasing returm \\'ith impelfect mobility is the 
main driver of the clustering of economic: activity and a key determinant of the way in which l.i.nk3ges 
between areas operate. Assessing the strength of such chlstering, its range across space, and its srope 
across industrial sectOIS is of key importance, as v.rill be clear from our detailed discussion below. 
Before continuing, '\lire Jmke three remarks. First, the analysis of linkages between cities and regiom is 
inherently a 'general equilibriwn' problem, in which tbe researcher has to look beyond the direct (or 
impact) effect of a change and assess the induced changes that follow. Doing this is possible only if 
there is a clear analytical :framewot:k within which the various effects interact. Second, the exact level 
of spatial disaggregation selected cannot be pre..OOtermined and depends on the questions being 
addressed and the availability of data.. 1b:i1:d, the usefulness of different levels of sectmal 
disaggregation for production is aJso a oontext specific matter of modelling judgement Put differently, 
the levels of spatial and sectoral disaggregation are contingent to the problem under scrutiny. 
Eljllilibrillm aml.its perturbatio11: With these ingredients in place the general! equilibrium of the 
system can be characterised, in which locati.on choices ;u;e made and wages, rents, and income levels 
determined. The eqnilibriUDI may be c:onc;trained in the short nm. because of supply rigidities or factor 
i.mmobilities that in the longer nm. are remo'lr>ed. 
4 See Durant on and Pnga (2004) for more on the micr~>-fomtdatioru of urban agglomeration economie!l~ 
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To understand the worlcings of these models, it is insightful to won:y about bow, given some :initial 
simation (that tmy either correspond to a short nm or a long nm equilibrium), the system adjusts to 
·shocks' to the economic environment Thinking about the effects of such shocks is also furubmental 
from a policy perspective_ There are three sorts of shocks to be considered each of which may result in 
different kinds of adjustment to the urban or regional system The first we tenn ' location specific.' 
shocks_ That is, some change, which has its direct impact on a single area;; for example, the 
construction of new houses or the closure of a f<lctory. The second are 'common' shocks. These are 
shocks, the direct impact of whi.ch is felt in many areas_ Examples are technological or institutional 
changes. The third sort of shock is •mtegtative' _This OCCUIS where the inter-area geography changes, 
as when a road is built or telecomnnmications improved. Such a cbcmge will have its own effects, 
possibly causing relocation of some activities, as \¥el.l as changing the economy's response to other 
shocks_ 
Chan11els of adjusllmmt: An economic shoc:k changes rclative prices and ilndm:es changes in 
quantities - relocations of activity - between areas_ There are potentially many channels of 
adjustment. Foflowing, say, a positive productivity shock somewhere, firms and worlrers may relocate, 
wages and/or rents may go up, the price of some final and intermediate goods may change, etc_ As will 
become dear below, the theoretical literature often makes fairly extreme assumptions about the 
mobility of goods and worlre£s and fue determination of prices_ Such simplifications are ~rammted 
when the objective is to clarify some aspect of the work:ings of the urban/regional system or replicate 
~ stylised filets_ However these simplifications also ln1ply that the channels of adjustment aft·er a 
shock are reduced to one or two, whilst most of the others are arbitrarily shut down by the extreme 
nature of the assumptions_ For policy purposes, howe\l""er, these channels of adjustment are everything_ 
For instance, the welfare effect of a negative location specific shock: may differ substantially if the 
adjustment takes place through a reduction in l.abour force participation as opposed to out-migration. 
In this respect, we do not know of any theoretical model of system of c.i.ties or economic geography in 
which the participation dec.i..sion ofwotkers is endogenous_ The only channel through wh.i.ch labour 
supply is 1!lSUally assumed to adjust is in and out-migration to and :from the area_ When trying to 
understand why some cities are specialised while others are diversified, this is an accq>table 
stmplifi.cation. When trying to understand how declining industrial cities :from Pittsburgh to Li"'elpOOl 
have adjusted after negative shocks, it is important to c.onsider a variety of channels of adjustment, 
including out-migration but also participation decisiom, etc. 
The main problem when considering a variety of channels of adjustment is that the algebra becomes 
very quickly intractable. .A.s we disoussed in the introduction, our choice here is to go instead for a 
graphical. exposition. As will become clear below, a graphical exposition can allow for a nruch more 
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flexible set of assumptions v.i thout neglecting the key .rdationships that govern what happens Vi.tithi.n 
areas and bem•een areas_ We first sketch our graphical device befo.re turning to its main applications. 
L.flbonr dema11d: The first key relationship ofboth urban systems and NEG is the area level aggregate 
production function relating total output in an area to tbe local inputs_ This relationship has received a 
considerable ammmt of theoretical attention_ The main spatial featur:e that the literature bas attempted 
to replicate is "agglomecrtion", Le., the ronce:ntiation ofa disproportionate slme of economic activity 
i.n a small set of areas_ A compelling (and sufficient) condition for agglomeration i.s the existence of 
(aggregate) increasing retw:ns at the area level Modelling agglomeration in this way is also consistent 
with a second major stylised tact: the increase of most measures of productivity per capita with the 
size of the loedl population_ Deriving a local aggregate prodoction fimction, which exhibits increasing 
retw:ns willlout the marlret structure being degenerate (e.g., a single p.roduoer per ar-ea), is a significant 
cllallenge_ 
~te this, the literature bas been fairly successful at proposing mi.croeconomic fou.ndations for Sl!lCh. 
local increasing returns_ These microfolDl.dations typically rely on one of three key mechanisms: 
sharing. matching o.r learning. Sharing mecbanisins emphasise how small indivistbiliti.es (like the med 
oosts associated with the production of a new local variety) can be aggregated to generate increasing 
returns because a larger local population allows every fixed cost to be spread over a larger number of 
customers. Matching me.chanisms show how larger m.arlrets increase tbe quality of mat.ches betv.'eell 
economic agents. and/or the probability of finding a match. Matching issues are important in a wide 
variety of contexts from the local labour marlret (employer-employee) to the local nmk:ets for 
intermediate goods. Finally, learning mechanisms aim to show how more frequent dif;ect .interactions 
between economic a:geots in denser environments favour the creation, difliusion and acCI.1DD.llation of 
knowledge (see Du:r.mton and Puga, 2004, for a review)-
A key feature that emerges from the literature on the microeconomi.c foundations of agglomeration is 
that many different mec:h.allisms all lead to a local production function that exhibits increasing returns_ 
For our ptuposes, this is a -..rery positive result because one can 3SSl.1llle some fonu of local increasing 
returns without having to rely on a specific mecl!anism The negative counteq>art of this result is that 
i.deo1ifying the precise sources of aggl01l1fifati.on \liill be diffirul.t (Rosenthal and Strange. 2004). "When 
concerned with policy, the second caveat is that these local increasing returns derive from specific 
market failures. Thus, production is in general inefficient, in the sense that it does not make the best 
possible use of local resources. lbi.s suggests a role for policy. but the appropriate corrective policies 
will depend on the exact mecha,n1srn at play: tbe corrective polici.es associated with urban knowledge 
spi.ll-overs are not the same as those stemming from imperfect matching on the labour market 
However since the state of our knowledge about tbe exact sources of agglomeration economies is still 
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very itn:Jpr;ocise-. it is legitimate to sbrt from such local aggregate production ftmctions and take them 
asgrven. 
If we assume that the three primitive factOIS of production are Jand, labour and capital and if 
furthermore land is peJfectly inunobile while capital :is perfectly mobile, the focus of our attention 
needs to be on labour_ Rather tmn on output per worker as fim.ction of the size of the local workforce, 
it is technically equivalent but more :frnitful in teml'> of interpretation to focus our attention on an 
m'lr"efSe-demand for labour relating fue wage of workers to the size of the local labour force. 1bis curve 
is represented m figme ta and we will refer to it as a 'wa:ge curve' in what follows. Consistent with 
the cmpiri.calliter.rture, the wage in area i as a fuoction of the local labour force. -w{NJ , is assumed to 
be mcreasmg m the size of the labour force reflecting the existence oflocal agglomeration 
externalities. 
The intensity of the local increasing retwns is captured by the slope of the wage CUI1le. Of cow:se, a 
neo-classical inverse wage curve would be downward s loping siloc:e the amount of land is fixed so the 
mugina1 product of labour decreases with city size and fhl1ing land per wortrer . Whether one should 
consider a concave or convex upward sloping curve for u{Ni) depends on the spec.ifi.cs of the 
microecononiic fmm.dations. 5 However, this is ultirmtely an empirical issue. Our concern. here is how 
the changes in the wage curve affect the equilibrilDll and how the slope of the ou:rve determines 
adjos.tment. Note that, at this stage, it is easier to assume that workers are either identical or are 
horizontally differentiated (i.e_, all eqmlly productive but specialised in different activities). Vertical 
differentiation (ice., a workforce whel"e some wotkers are more productive l:ban others) is ignored for 
the time being but its main consequences will be explored later. 
Area crowdi11g: Ibe second crucial relationship concerns the various c.osts assoc-iated with having a 
significant m.m1ber of households living in the same area and so we will talk of a 'oost of living ourve, . 
The main components ofthe cost of living are the oost of COIDDll.Jting, housing and other consumption 
goods. The key question regards the shape of the cost of living cwve as a fimction of the size of the 
loc.al population. It seems reasonable to assume that commuting costs increase wi:th population 
because a. larger popl!llation implies longer ooDli1Dlles and more oongested roads. Similarly, one 
expects increasing population to drive up the cost ofland and thus of housing. However, the impact of 
area size on the cost of consumption goods is more complicated. A higher oost of land will have 
implications for the price of consumption goods throughout the local economy (higher retail oosts etc). 
' For instance-. the popular two-stage production func-tions derived from the Dixit and Stiglitz (1977} model of 
monopolistic competition generate a conv ex: \\rage curve while those derived from Salop ( 1.979) imply a c.oncave 
curve. 
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On the other hand, a. larger ma:rket offers a \¥:ider variety of suppliers without having to import goods 
from elsewhere. 
Two additi0113l factors, \li'hich do not depend on loc.a] market size, may also be important in 
determining the cost of living. First, external geography plays a role here because importing goods 
from other areas may be costly and these costs will be captmed by this curve as well. Second, and 
particnlarty crucial from a policy pe~spective, land-use and planning regulations will also have an 
impact since they affect the supply of land. 
We represent this curve m figure 1 b where we assume that the cost of living increases with popW.ation 
(the alternative case will be discussed further below). 6 For reasons that will berome obvious, this 
cw:ve is represented \vith a reversed Y-axis. 'fo be able to use this curve in a simple and tractable way, 
we Imke two simplifying assumptions when drawing it The first one is that the cost of living is paid 
W. monetacy terms only. 'The serond is that housing consumption per household is fixed_ These two 
simplifications imply that changec; to the wage cwve will leave the cost of living ourve l.Dl.changed In 
reality, conumlfing costs have both a monetary and a time component so an increase iln the wage rate 
W.oreases the shadow cost of comnmting and thus shifts the cost of living curve dowmvw1s on the 
figure. By the same token, an increase in the wage rate tends to W.crease demand for housing and thns 
land, making land nrore ,expensive_ Again, this would shift the aost ofliving curve down\\'3fds_ It is 
important to note that more founal modelling ,e(fher ignores these effects or suggests they are second 
order and thus do not completely offset the direct effect of a shock to the wage curve. Hence, to keep 
the exposiition simple, we ignore these effects in what follows. It would, however, be easy (though 
cumbersome) to consider them 
Like the wage cmve, the po-sition and slope of the cost of living curve reflects a range of market 
Cillwes, w-hich means that outcomes may be inefficient. For instaru:e., m-priced wban congestion will 
imply an W.efficieotly ltigh cost ofliving for any level of population. We will treat these i.neffi.cienc.i.ec; 
as given, just like those associated v.;itb the microeconomics of production, since the object of this 
paper is not their detailed study. This doec; not, however, pre\l'ellt the analysis of the broader 
implications of, for instanre, a reduction iln congestion in the centre of a large capital city due to 
congestion charging (e.g. , London) or the construction of a mass-transit system (e.g., Bogota). For 
such change<;, \"\-'e consider that tb.e main direct effect is to shift the cost of living curve for thec;e citiec; 
upW'3l"ds. That is, to reduce the cost of living for a given population size. Ohanges to the supply of land 
for housing as, say, local planning regJ!llations are relaxed will shift the curve similarly . 
6 For 1he moment, we assmne that everyone living in a city works so that we can use 1he tenns population and 
labour force interohmge.ably. Later, when considering issues oflabour force participation we will need to 
distinguish between the rnro . 
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The di:ffemnoe between the wage CllliVe and the cost of living cmve is represented in figure k 1bis 
curve represents the net disposable wage fm the area and thus V\re call it the 'net wage cunre' . In the 
case of figure l c, the curve is bell-shaped. Tlris correspon~ to the traditional case ofurban economics 
where agglomeration economies dominate crowding costs for a small population, \liWe the reverse 
occurs fm a large population. Fm this to be the case, the slope of the wage curve must be larger than 
that ofthe cost of living curve below a certain threshold, while it is smaller above this threshold~ At 
this threshold, the net wage reaches its peak (point Bin the figure). This peak can be interpreted as 
identifying an optimal city size. 7 
Labour Sllppl.J·: The second curve represented in figure tc is an irnverse labour supply curve. It 
indicates for any level of real wage, how nmch l:a:bom is supplied in the area. For simplicity, \7\re 
temporarily assume that labour supply is a ftmction of the total local population and ignore labom 
fmce participation decisions. In that case,. this ,curve esseotially captmes the migration response to 
local \1i'<lges. A low level of mobility between areas will be captured by a very steep la:bom supply 
cw:ve (i.e., even large wage differences do not impact nmch. on migration flows), \lfhile perfect 
mobility will imply a flat labour supply cmve (ie., small V\'<lge differences imply large migration 
flov.-s). Area specmc effects, such as amenities, will shift this cmve, with a more attractive area facing 
a labour supply curve that is below that of a less attractive area (wotkers accept a lower real wage but 
are compensated by bigber amenities). 
Eqllilibrinm: The internection between the la:bom supply and net wage curves determines the 
equilibrinm of the model. The intersection between these two curves may not be unique. In figure lc, 
the two curves inte:Isect twice {at A and q. The labour supply curve first ruts the net wage curve from 
above (at A) and then from below (at q. Point A is not a stable ,equilibrium It is easy to see that a 
smill positive population shock will raise the net wage.. In nun, from the supply omve, v;.oe see this 
higher net wage attracts more wor:lrers, which again I3.ises net wages and this process continues tmtil 
the area reaches point C. By the same token, a negative shock at point A will lead population and 
wages to fall t,e zero. Turning to the Sft:Ond interBection in C, a slmilar argument verifies lhat this 
. . . . . . . . * 
equilibrinm liS stable~ From figure 1 c., once we have established the equili.Driwn populatl.on ( N ) at 
. . . * pomt C, we can trace up\lomds to figures la and lb to read off the equilibrium wage ( w ) and cost of 
living (lt ), respectively. 
1 More accurately, this is the constrained optimal ci.ty size, Optimality here is conditional on the loc.a.l wages 
being optimal given the population. As shown by Duranton and Puga (2004), unconstrained optimality is 
unl.il:e]y to occur since it requir'es :m effic.ient production prooess in the area while, as we disoussed earlier in the 
text, the assumptions needed to generate agglomention usually require some maiket failnre. Hence 
agglomeration is in general associated with inefficient production and the opti.ma.l!ity of city size is constrained 
by that inefficiency. 
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3. A diagrammatic comparison of systl'ms of citi.l's and NEG 
In this section, vore show that our <tiagramrmtic framework can be used to explain the workings of both 
thewban systeo:J5 and NEG literatme. We begin v;rith Henderson' s(l974) system of cities model 
before turning to NEG. 
Urhau systems 
Henderson (1974) assumes that there are local increasing returns taking place \vithin itndnstries 
(localisation economies). This implies that the wage cur\l'e is as in figure la but specific to each sector. 
Different sectors :may show different degrees of increasing returns. Figure 2a represents the wage 
curve for two different industries, 1 and 2. as afimcJion of local industry employment. In the figure, 
industry 2 exhlbits stronger increasing returns than industry 1. a: These final goods are assruned to be 
freely tradable so that there is no issue of market access. 9 We assume that the cost of living depends on 
the total workforce in the city and this relationship is dra\w in figure 2b. 
The :fu:st result of the model, that an cities \vill. be fully specialised in equilibrium, follows :from the 
assumption toot increasing returns are incfustry specific, but the cost of fu.'"ing depends on total 
workforce. The reasoning behind this result is fue foUowing. Imagine that instead ofbeing fully 
specialised. a city has positive employment in both i.n:dffitry 1 and 2 With workers being mobile 
between industries, the equilibrium requires wage equalisation between the two industries. The only 
possible interior equilibrium nmst be where the two cmves intersect. Assume then a small shock, 
which moves ,employment to industiy 1 at the expense of industiy 2. Such a shook will imply a higher 
wage in industry 1 and a lo\\-rer wage in industry 2. This in tum will imply IDO!'e worlrecs moving from 
industry 2 to in.dustiy 1, etc. The only stable equilibrimn nmst thus involve the fuJI specialisation of 
each city in either industiy 1 or indusby 2. 
As discussed above, provided that at some pomt the marginal increase in cost of living begins to 
dominate the marg[nal increase in \\rages in industries 1 and 2. the net wage curve will be bell-shaped 
for both industries. These two rucves are represented in figure 2c. Note that optimll city size is larger 
for industry 2. with the stronger increasing returns. Assume that labour is perfectly mobile across 
8 Note that in figure 2a, the wage curves for the two industries. cross. Assuming that both goods are indispensable 
then, in equilibrium, prices of the t\vo goods must adjust to emure that this is fue c~. If the tv.-o curves did not 
cross, one activity would ahvays pay more and thus attract all the worl:ers. and the other good would not be 
f~:::~sts, which imply th:U :m.a.rl:et access matters, introduce further c.omplicati.ons, which are dealt with in 
the ,expo!rit:ion of the NEG fi:amevi.rorlr_ 
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c-ities so that the labour supply rurve is flat This implies that the short-n.m. ,equilibriwn will be gi.ven 
by points A and B, "With net v."<lge the same in both cities and the population N A and N B for the cities 
specialised in indllsby 1 and 2, respec;tively. 
At this stage, two importmt propes:ties must be noted. First, all cities will be too large with respect to 
their constraioed optimal city size following the same stability argwnent as previously.10·11 Second, all 
cities with the same specialisation nmst be of the same size. lt is interesting to note that this prediction 
receives Dlild empiri.cal support (Henderson, 1988). 
The crucial issue "Wifb regard to long nm equilibrium concerns the mechanism for city creation. In the 
long run, the DIJ.Dd>er of cities irs not fixed but instead can vary depending on the action of land 
developers. The model assu.IlrS that these developers can Cl"'eate cities of a size of their choosing and 
C3!ll use fiscal instruments to appropriate rent to finance their activity. The optimal strategy of a 
competitive land developer is thus to create a city of optimal :size and tax the workefi the difference 
between the real wage that the city o :ffelS and the real wage that can be obtaffied elsewhere. As 
worket:s move to the newly created ,cities, they leave old established cities. A decline in the size of the 
latter "Will increase the net wage they can offer to their wod::fl5_ In 1um, this dampens the incentive for 
further new c-ities to be developed In equil.ibrimn, the :free-entry of c.ompeti.tive developers will imply 
that aJl cities will reaoh their optimal size. 
This irs not the end of the story, however. Note that in figure 2c the peak of the indllsby 2 curve (the 
maximum real wage payable in an optimally sized industJ:y 2 city) lies above the peak ofthe industry 1 
cwve. lbat is, cities in md1Jstry2 can offer a higher \\"<lge at their constr.rined optimal size. However, 
these differences cannot persist in equilibrium. "With competitive land developers because they imply 
higher returns for building indnstry 2 cities. These higher re1ums induce the development of relatively 
more new citi.es specialised in indl!lstiy 2_ Thns output in industry 2 inCI'eases more than output in 
i.ndustiy 1 and this causes the relative price of industry 2 ' s final good to decline. This dedine in price, 
pushes down the demand for labour in mcmstry 2 and so the wage cmve moves downwards. 1bis 
10 It is important to note that cities are O\'ersized only v.ith respect to their constrained optimal size (ie., the 
=optimal" size, wmch ignores ineffic-iencies in both produc:otion and hoUiSingfco:mmuting). If for instance 
production is inefficient in figure 2a, it may well be the case fua.t the fust~best wage cmve is above the 
equilibrium wage cmve v.l]th a steeper slope. This steepa first-best wage cmve would imply an unconstrained 
optimal city size larger (and posSioly mw:h largei-) fuan the constrained optimal me. Then the comparison 
between the futly optimal city size and fue eqllihorinm 'city size is iUIIbiguons since fuere are two distortions 
pushing in opposite directions. On the ·one hand, without a mai.ket for cities, equilibrium city size is too large. On 
the ·other hand, all the benefits from agglomeration are unlikely to be exhausted, v.rhich implies eql!li.horium c ity 
size being too smalL As discussed in the text, in reality, we also expect important inefficiencies Teganting fue 
detennination of the cost of living. Such ineffic-iencies. are like:ly to increase the gap between the c:,onstrained and 
WlOOnstrained optimal city SUe. 
11 Note that fuis result is to some extent an artefact ofperlec:.t b.bom mobility. With an upward sloping labom 
!rupply cnnre, equilihriliiiD. city size can be stable in the region. of increasing Tetmns_ See below for more an fuis_ 
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process continues Wl.til op1imal city size is the same for both types of cities . Tbis long mn equilibrium 
is shown in figure 2d Developers tmke zero profit for both. types of cities, all types of cities reach 
thcir optimal size and worlrers receive the same net wage evefY\lihere. Fina.lly, citi.es export the good 
they produce and import all other goods. 
This model is still a landmark in the literature, providing the first consistent model of an urban system 
in which cities arise eodogenomly from a tension between agglomeration economies and urban 
crowding while interacting together through trade. The useftllness of this m.odei for policy purpose 
remains, however, limited Consider for instance a negative productivity shock in a given city (which 
reduces the margjnaJ! productivity of labour by a given proportion). 'The net wage at the optimal c.ity 
size will end l!lp below that offered in other cities_ Workers will move out of this city and a land 
developer wiU choose an empty site to develop another city of optimal size_ .Alternatively, a negative 
common productivity shock affecting all cities of a given type will lead to cities of smaller size and, 
depending on the substitntrbility between goods, more or less cities of that type_ These examples 
clearly show that the ultimate margin of adjustment m. the model is the number of cities_ In tum, 
adjos.ting the nmnber ofcities depends cruc.ially on the assumption of perfect labour mobility. Oeady, 
cities do not enter and exit the urban landscape hke this, particularly in European countries where the 
activity of land developers is severely restricted._ 12 
Despite its drawbacks for policy analysis, this model has served as a stnting point for much of the 
subsequent theoretical work on urban systems (see Duranton and Puga, 2000, for a survey of this 
literature}. Unfortunately, most of the extensions of this fuu:nework are concerned with only two 
issues: providing more detailed or alternative microeconom.ic foundations for the wage curve and 
genernting more realistic predictions for the composni.on of economic activity m. c.ities, since full 
specialisa.tion is obviously too extreme.. These extensions, however, do not tackle the problem of the 
eoiiy and exit of cities (Helsley and Strange., 1997, and more recently, Henderson and Venables. 2004, 
are rare exceptiom) or the issue ofitmperfect labour mobility. Later m. the paper, we oomider the issue 
of labour mobility as well as a nUDlber of policy mlevant extemions, but for now we leave the w:ban 
systems literature and twn our attention to NEG. 
12 In contrast, in countries with fast growing populations, city creation is of fimdamenta I importance to avoid the 
c.onoentration of population in a few grossly oversized cities_ The exit of citie:s. remains a much more contentious 
issue. First, Emopean governments are highly reluctant to let fa.iliDg cities experience sustained population 
declines_ Second, even in the absence ofpolic.i·es to pre\•ent exits, real exits are rare occurrences_ This is because 
an existing stock of housing capital is very .slow to depreciate. Low rents, possibly falling below the rental c.ost 
ofc:apita.l, allow dedining cities to retain oome population . A complete analysis of the appropriateness of these 
policies is. beyond the s.oope of this paper. 
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New Ecollomic Geograplty 
Despite very significant modelling di.ff'erences, the core models ofNEG can be explained with the 
same graphical devi(je_ 1bis is because, as we argue below, a wage ourve and price index (ie., cost of 
living curve) lie at the heart ofNEG mode-ls. As above, the difference between the nominal \vage and 
the cost of living curve then defines a net \lo"'<lge curve and assumptions on labour mobility between 
areas allow one to deri"'e the long-run equihDriwn 13 The use of our graprucal device i.s, hov,"ever, 
tmde more di fficult in NEG because in some core models (e.g., Krugman, 1991), the wage equation 
and the price index do not admit closed-fOIID solutions_ To get rotmd this difficulty, we can citber rcly 
on numerical solutions for specific parameter vahJes or instead use variants of these core models that 
can be solved analytically (Ottaviano, Tabuchi. and Thisse, 2002, and Forslid and Ottaviano, 2003). 
Models in the line ofKmgman (1991) consider two areas and 1\\-'0 sectors_14 For ease of exposition in 
what follolN-s, we appeal to NEG' s roots in intermtioml trade and refer to the first area as ' Home' and 
the second as 'Foreign' . The first sector produces sODie homogenous good tmder constant ret:u:ms. To 
simplify the derivation of the model, this good is assumed to be pelfectly tradable (so that its price is 
·equal m both .areas and can be normalised). This sector is often referred to as ' agriculture' or identified 
with some traditional good for which wcnkers are immobile both geographically and sect.orally (i.e., 
they always work in this homogenous good sector)_ Given these mobility assumptions, the wage in 
this sector can then be derived directly from the nonnalised price of the good it produces. For 
empirical and policy purpose, it i.s enough to assume the existence of some autonomous or residual 
demand in each area ( e_g_, c-ivil servants, pensioners, de) so that this sector can remain in the 
ba-okground, whi.le attention focuses on 'manufacturing' . Manufacturing consists of a m.unber of firms, 
each operating with internal economies of scale and producing their individual variety of differentiated 
product This sector is monopolistically competitive as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Assumptions on 
the substitutability between goods enswe that all consumers dem:md all varieties and so each finn 
sells i1s output in both areas. Thus if manufl.cturing is operating in both areas, there is • intra-i.ndus.try 
tiade· . However, the presence oftransport rosts means that fum;' sales have a ' home-muketbias'_15 
Manufactl!lring workers are mobile and go to the area that offeJ:S them the highest utility_ 
13 Note that for the 'ease of presentation the prioe index is subtracted from the wage, instead ofdiv.iding the wage 
by l:his index. For this to be technically 'correct, both the wage OUIVe and price index. shou]d be dmwn on a log 
scale~ 
14 The properties below are those ofForslid and Ottaviano' s (2003) model, which differ only minimaUy from 
Krugman 0 991) _ 
H The literature also uses the concept oftrade ,c.osts. ratha- than transport costs. We think of the forma- as a 
broader concept, which encompasses tr.msport oosts rogether v."ith maD.J' other costs associated with trading 
goods remotely. For our pmpose, we take these two concepts to be ,equivaJent. 
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Ibe wage of the workers in the manufuctw:ing sector in an Mea is represented by the \"\'age rurve in 
figure 3a. The shape of the wage curve is the result of a subtle tra<Je..off bet\vee:n two opposing force£: 
a crowding effect on the product market and a home-matket ·effect_ 1be resolution of dri.s trade-off and 
hence the slope oftbe curve, depends on the level oftransport costs. For hi.gh transport costs, the wage 
curve is downward sloping (the plain curve), whi.le for low 1ra:nsport costs it is upv;rard sloping (the 
dashed curve}. 
To better understand this, consider Home (symmetric argwnents hold for Foreign) and assume that 
employment in the rnamlf.acturing sector is arbitrarily small in Home (and thus most man:uf3cturing 
activity takes place in Foreign} Note that with. high transport costs, manufacturing goods produced in 
Foreign will be expensive in Home. Hence, not only does Home have relatively few producers bnt 
these producers are also protected from imports by high transport costs_ They can thus charge high 
prices, which imply high wages for the workers employed in manufacturing in Home. Hence, when 
the mrumfacturing wotkforce in Home is small and transport costs are high, Home pays high 
mrurufacturing wages. Now, continue to make the same assnmption on the shares of employment in 
the two different areas, hnt assume that tr<WSpOrt costs are veTf low. With low tr.msport costs, the 
protection -enjoyed by mannfucturing in Home is eroded. In tum, this leads to lower mam:l.'fucturing 
prices and thus lower '\'irages in Home_ Hence, when the manufiu:turing labour force is small in an area., 
local \\'ages are increasing in tr.msport ocms.. 
Consider now the effect on the '\'irage of an increase in the size of the tmn.ufacturing workforce in 
Home. There are m'O offsetting effects. First, a larger workforce in mamlfaoturing means a larger 
income in Home. Given tmt transport cos.ts are positive, this extra demand will disproportionatcly 
benefit Home producers. This is the home market effect and it tends to increase wage. Note that the 
home madcet effect is weaker when tr:msport costs are low. 1bis is because lower transport costs :rmke 
d easier to import foreign goods. Consequently, when Home income increases following an expansion 
of the manufacturing workforce, a greater sbar:e oftbat increase \vill be devoted to manufacturing 
goods produced in Foretgn when transport costs are lower. 
Ibe second effect of a larger manufacturing work force is that there are more firms, which crowds the 
product market VJhen transport costs are high, tbe dermnd from Foreign will be low and the market 
faced by the Home firms will essentially boil down to the Home muk:et. Then, a larger manufacturing 
workforce implies more Home :fums but more Home firms simply lead to a more crowded local 
product market and this lowers prices and wages . This is the muk:et crowding effect mentioned above. 
Note that the market crowding effect is also attenmted for lower tr.msport costs. This is becal!lSe lower 
tr.msport costs make it easier to export manufacturing goods so that an expansion of the manufacturing 
workforce has a less detrimental effect on Home prices (and thus wages). n turns out that for high 
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transport costs, crowding dominates and the \"\'age CUIVe is downward sloping (the solid line in figure 
3a)_ In contrast, when transport coSits are low, the home tmrlret effect can dominate leading to an 
upward slopitog wage curve (the dashed line in figure 3a).. 
The reasons for this reveiSal are quite subtle~ We have already shown above that when the 
mmufaduring labour force is small in an area, local wages are increasing ito. transport costs_ We now 
show that when the manufacturing labour foroe is large ito. an area, this relationship is reversed 
implying that the wage aurve slopes up for low transport costs and down for high transport costs. To 
see this, it is easiest to take a specific example_ Thus, assume that Home employs 50 workers in 
agriculture and 100 workers in manufacturing, while foreign employs 50 workers i.n each sector_ 
Consider first the :Dli.Mket crowding effect, which depends on the number of mannfacttu:ing firms in 
Home relative to the size of the nnf.ket for those firms_ .As transport costs decline, the manufactw:ing 
sector in Home gradually gains a better access to 100 consumers.. Hence, as transport costs decline 
from infinity to zero, the market for mamifac111Tingfl1717S located in Home increases from 150 to 250, 
i.e., by 66%. Consider now the home market effect, which depends on the shafe of home 
mmufacturing :fums i.n the pmchases of Home COilSUIDf:[S_ As transport costs decr:ease, workers i.n 
Home spend a rugber fraotion of their manufucturing expenditure on imported goods. More 
specifically, when transport coots are itnfini.te, Honr consumers buy their manufacturing varieties from 
the home rrumubcturing sectors, that is from tOO manufuctnring wodrers_ When transport costs are 
zero, they can buy their manufaoturing goods from manJJJiacturing in both areas, that is from 150 
mmufacturing workers_ Hence, as transport costs decrease from infinity to zero, th2 manufacturing 
mllrk2tfor consznners in Home increases by 5(?/o. Put differently, 3iS transport costs decline, the 
market for Home producers increases faster than the market for home consumers. Thus market 
crowding decre<liSes faster than the home Illalket effect. For sufficiently low transport costs the home 
market effect dominates the crowding effect and Home will pay higher wages. That is, for sufficiently 
low tr.msport costs, loc~ wages in large areas are decreasing in transport costs. Remembering that the 
relationship between local wages and transport costs is reversed for small areas, we see that for low 
transport costs the wage curve must be upward sloping while it nmst be do""-nward sloping for high 
tlansport costs_ 
What about the cost of living? By 3iSsumptlon, NEG neglects issues relating to land and housing and 
so fue cost of living i.n an area will be determined only by the price itndex. for the imperfectly tr.lded 
(ie. manufaduring) goods. When the mamlfacturing wotkforce i.n an area is small, the sbare of 
imported goods is large, which puts upward pressure on prices as these goods are subject to transport 
costs_ As local m.arket size in.c:reas:es, loc.a] prices are pushed downwards. Consequently, the cost of 
living declines v;rith the size of the area. 
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Lower tr.msport costs have two implications for the cost of living curve. First, it is obviollS tbat, 
conditional on the size of the area, the price index is lower when transport costs are lower_ Second, 
and sligbtl:y less obvious. the lower transport costs the less important is own area size in detennini.ng 
the price iiodex and so the flatter is the oost ofliving curve_ Thus m figtu:e 3b the dashed line gives the 
cost of living with low tr.msport costs, the solid line with high transport costs_ 
In figure 3c, we report the resulting net wage curve, i.e., the difference between the wage and the cost 
of living, for both high and low transport costs_ In each case, there is a symmetric curve for the other 
area since the swn of the population of both areas is a constant_ Thus we can draw the curves for both 
areas on the same figure (with a thick line for Home and a thin line for Foreign), the distance between 
the two vertical axes being equal to the total popula1ion.. For high transport costs, the relevant net wage 
cw:ves are represented by the solid lines which are decreasing: net -wage declines \\-ri:th the size of the 
loc.al mannfacturing population since both the nominal v.13ge and the cost of living increase_ Both 
curves intersect for areas of eqml size at A which represent the symmetric equilibrium The 
·equ.ilibrinm is stable in this case.. To see this, imagine shifting a worker to Home from Foreign_ The 
net wage falls in Home and ri.ses in Foreign so that the wmke:r ·wishes to move back to Foreign and so 
symmeby is restored, In con:ti3St, for low tr.msport costs, the relevant net -wage curves are represented 
by the dashed lines, \Vhich are now increasing_ The symmetric equilibrium at B is now unstable_ 
Again, to see this, imagine moving one worker to Home from Foreign_ In con:lr.lst to the situation with 
high tr.msport cost, this pertwbation r.lises the net wage in Home, thus attracting more workers and 
further rnsing the net wage_ This suggests that with low transport costs., the only stable equilibria 
involve concentration in either Home or Foreign. Of course, given that the two areas start out 
symmetric, we cannot S3Y which of these two equilibria will be reached. 
One of the strengths of this class of model is that it allows investigation of i.ntegrntive shocks . Indeed, 
in his original paper Krugman (1991) focuses on the question of what happens to the equilibrium as 
transport costs are reduced The answer is given by the comparison betv.reen the two kinds of 
equilibria m figure Jc_ If transport costs are high, then manufacturing is equally divided between the 
two areas, essentially because of the need to supply the immobile co1lS1!lillf:IS_ As transport costs fall, i.t 
becomes easier to snpply all COilSllt11efS from a single area At low 1r.msport costs the symmetric 
equilibrinm is unstable, and the stable equih.Oria require all manufacturing activity be concentrated m 
one of the two areas (with the equilibrium being at either point C or C'. depending on whether the 
agglomeration occurs in Home or Foreign, respectively)_16 
16 ~shown in Fujita et al (1999), the basic. results of this model generalise to a more ,c.ompl ex. geography with 
nmltiple areas. 
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Ibe model demonstr.!tes i.n a particularly sharp way how concentration can arise from mark:et access 
effects, even without any externalities ·within the ll13Dllfllcturing sector_ The v."'O:i<: ofKrugman (1991) 
has setved as point of departure for a large literature (see Ottaviano and Thisse, 2004, for a survey). 
Before turning to these extensions, a comparison between the two frameworks analysed so :fur is 
w.uranted 
Compari11g the two callonicalmodels 
As we discussed in the introduction, 1he approaches based on urban system; and NEG are often 
perceived as disjoint and commonly studied and further developed separately, often by different 
people. AJthough the approaches do differ, the previous two subsections make it clear that the 
difference£ between mban system; and NEG are about the key asswnptions of the models rather than 
the nature of the models themselves. In a nutshell, the core model ofm:ban systems relies on local 
agglomeration effects and local congestion effects in the context of a large number of areas. NEG 
mstead re-ilies on fum level increasing returns and 1he existence of tr.msport costs between a small, 
discrete munber of areas . 
These assumptions translate into differences for the shape ofthe three mains curves: the \Vage cwve, 
the cost of living curve, and the labom supply curve. The wage Cll[\)·e is unequivocally increasing in 
the wban system; approach. Because of an sorts of local externalities (technological spillovers, thick 
labour market effects and input-output linkages) it is assumed that increasing returns occur in each 
area. In contrast in NEG the wage curve may be increasing or decreasing. This is because, as we have 
sbo\Jirn, the subtle trade-offbetween a crov;rding effect (a larger workforce leads to an increasingly 
crowded local market) and a home market effect (a !Mger world'orce implies a larger local market 
which. benefits all local firms) depends on the level of transport costs. Even when the v;•age curve is 
llp\li'3fd s loping, there are no pure local extemalities in the NEG model, only pecuniary effects that 
ooour because of transport costs and increasing returns to scale at the fum level 
Ultitmtely, the most appropriate shape for the \wge cmve is an ·empirical question. However, it is 
important to note that a priori, the assumption made by the urban systems literature would appear to be 
relevant at smaller spatial scales where local externalities are expected to play a role. By rontrast, the 
NEG assumptions are better suited to larger sp·atial units (regi.ons, countries or even groups of 
countries) for which. long distm.ce market interactions are expected to play an important role while 
short distance effects become of secondary importance.. 
Tw:ning to the cost of living curve, dlere is again a sharp contr3sl The cost of living increases with 
population size for the urban system model while it decreases with size in NEG. Again, as wi.th the 
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1.vage ourve, the sbape of the cost of living curve is an empirical issue_ However, the spatial scale at 
which these theories are applied is likely to matter for this auve as \"~lelL With a more urban focus, the 
literature on systems of citi.es pays a lot of attention to rising land and comnn:Itiog oosts. Instead, NEG, 
with its more regional perspecfure, views romnmtmg and homing costs as second order :i.ssue5 
compared to the importance of umket acc.ess and its impact on the price of ronsw:nption goods. 
The :final ourve to consider is the labour Sl!lpply curve. Both sets of models assmne that manu.f.acmring 
workers are perfectly mobile betwem. areas and that they will move until net wages are equalised 
across areas. There is one subtle difference in that assumptions on the spatial distribution of immobile 
workers fiixes a-priori the munber of spatial units in NEG approaches while the ll1.lli1ber of areas is 
determined endogenously in the urban systems approach. However, the role of the number of spatial 
units turns olllt to be relatively unimportant As shown by Fujita d aL (1999), the results of the core 
NEG model generme to a larger number of regions.17 From om diagrammatic exposition above, it is 
clear that the wban systems approach can readily be generalised to a smalL discrete number of cities 
(see Papageorgiou and Pines, 1999, for more on this). 
Pulling all of this together, we would argne that there is no inherent contradiction between the mban 
system approach and NEG: the latter is trying to explain broad trends at large spatial scales while the 
former attempts to explain "spikes" of.ecooomic activity. Clearly, bringing these hvo approaches 
together in a tmilled framework is an important goal for future r;esearch.lll This is important because 
distinguishing empirically betwem. a ' 'trend"' and a "spike~ is not easy, especially as a series of spikes 
can imply a trend when none may be present 19 
4. Using our framework "With Pmting extensions of thP system of cities and NEG approaches 
In this section, we use our ftamewot:k to consider a number of extensions to the urban systems and 
NEG models that bave been proposed in the literature. We start with m.ro extensions to the NEG 
approach, before turning to extensions to the urban systems model 
The rise and fall ofregional ineq11alities: adding hm1si11g 
The c.ore NEG framework can be emiched by ·either adding more features on the production side 
(changing the wage curve) or more features on the dispersion side (changing the cost ofhving auve). 
17 Howe\•er, for policy pwpose the number of areas matters for the nu.niber of v.'inners and losers and 1he 
magoimdes offhe .gajm and losses as the spatial economy adjusts to shocks. 
11 See Fujita, Krugman, and Mori (1999) and Tabuchi (1998) for tv,m very different early attempts. 
19 We note thai: exiting ·empirical work nmally ignore!! this fimdamental issue. 
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Regarding the cost of living curve, one particularly mtuca.l extension is to :Unpose some constraints on 
land supply by assuming that housing is imperfectly elasti.cally supplied so that house prices are 
increasing with population. 20 This extension can easily be inootporated in to our diagrammatic 
framework by reoognizing tbat the cost of living curve will now depend on both the cost of 
consumption goods and the cost of housing. As the size of the area. rises, the price of consumption 
goods falls (as discussed above) but thi5 full is offset by rising house prices_ At some point, we would 
expect rising house prices to dominate and 1hi:s implies a bell-shaped cost of living ClJlVe_ Perhaps the 
clearest way to picture this is to add together the cost of living curve in figure 1, which captur:es house 
prices and congestion, with the curve from figure 3, \vhich captures the price index effect_ This non-
monotonic cost of living curve is represented in Figure 4b. As with the oore NEG model, falling 
transport costs will have two effects on this cost of living curve_ First, lower transport costs shift the 
cw:ve up. Second, as transport costs decline, the :first part of the bell shape for the cost of living 
becomes flatter as mruket access m.a.tters less and less_ At very low transport costs, mruket access is 
essmtially irrelevant and the cost of living curve is monotonically increasing m the size of the 
mrurufacturing work force_ 
For high transport costs, combining the vorage CUI1le from. the core NEG model with a bell-shaped cost 
of living curve leaves the net wage curve essentially unchanged compared to figure 3, so symmetric 
3ff'2S is still the only stable equilib:riu.m It is represented by point A in figure 4c_ For intermediate 
transport costs, a bell-shaped cost of living c;urve implies a bell-shaped net v;rage curve consistent with 
~but not complete agglomeration of manufacturing workers in a single area.. Note tbat this 
extension leads to a net v;rage cmve tbat is similar to that in the tuban system approach. This is 
parbrnlarly interesting given that the forces driving these two curves are very different. In this case, 
the symmetric situation is no longer a stable equilibrium Instead the two stable equilibria at B and B' 
involve some agglomeration of mannf3.cturing in one area or the other_ Finally, when transport cost are 
very low, the net wage curv'e now mterseds the net wage curve for the other area in its downward 
sloping region_ The symmetric situation inC is again a stable equilibritu:n_ 21 
Once again, we can work through the thought ~t of allowing transport msts to fall and think 
wmt this implies for equilibrium.. When transport costs are very high, ll13llllfucturing workeiS are 
evenly distnlruted across areas because it would be too expensive to serve the agri.cul1:ur31 demand of a 
·periphoar area (no manufacturing) from an agglomerat-ed •cor;e' . Then, for intennediate transport 
20 Helpman (199 &) present a fonnal model incorporating this assmnption but changing o1her l:ey asswnp1ions of 
the 'c.ore Kingman model In the text, we prefer to use om gzaphical framework to' assess what happens if 
housing costs are added to the core Kmgma:n model 
21 Both 1he wage and the c.ost of living are increasing iin city size. That the change i.n cost of living ,dominates 
depends on the so called ' no bJack b. ole' condilion which impose the necessary constrain1s on the relevant 
pacameten 
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costs, it pays for man;ufacturing wodcers to agglomerate and ec.onomise on lr.msport oosts while 
senrmg peripheral famlers from the core_ Flnally, for low tr.wsport costs, high housing costs in the 
core become dominant The effects of market integration on the location of activity are therefore 
ambiguous in this type offtamewrnk_ At relatively high levels of transport costs a reduction in barriers 
promotes spatial disparities. At lower levels it pennit:s the dispersion of activity and a narrowing of 
disparities. This is an example of the funous bell-shaped effect of Diarket integration on regional 
inequality. 
The rise and fall of regional i11equalities: addingi11plll-Olllplllli11kages 
A similar type of outcome can be obtained from a very different extension ofNEG _ Following Puga 
(1999) and Krugman and Venables (1995), assume v.-'Orlcers are mobile across sectors (agricnltwe and 
mmufacturing) but not across areas. This last assumption allows us to simplify our diagram since 
labom mu:ket equilibrium only requires that agrirultnre and manufacturing workers get paid the same 
nominal wage r.rther than the same net wage, since all types of \li'orkers in an area w'ill faoe the same 
cost of living_ 22 The agricultural good is fi:ee1y tr.l.dable across areas and is produced using Jabom and 
land The \V3ge in agriculture as a fimction of manufacturing employment is represented by the dashed 
upward-sloping curve in figures 5 a-c._ This line slopes upwards because increased manufacturing 
employment in an area implies lowec agrirnltur:il employment, higher land to lalxn.n- ratios in 
agriculture and thus higher agricultural wages. 
The mannfucturing sector is as in Krugman (1991) with the added complication that existing varieties 
are also used as intermediate inputs by manufactming producers_ This implies that the shape of the 
wage cwve for manntacturing will be the outcome of a trade-off between three different forces. First, 
and as in Krogman (1991), market c:row<ting SJtill occurs: as the size ofthe manufacturing sector 
incceases locally, the price index declines. Under free-enlry, a decline in the price index implies lhat 
the maximum wage that produrers can pay also declines_ Second, there is also a home--nw::ket effect as 
in Krugman (1991)_ Since workers are imnw:bile geographically, the workings ofthis effect are 
slightly different :fr001 that in Krugman (1991). A large manufacturing sector locally ilmplies a larger 
mruket for manufacturing goods because the manufacturing sectm consumes its own varieties as input, 
whereas in Krogman (1991) the effect was driven by the increase in the nwnber of workers. Third, 
there is an additional local increasing return working through cost linkages: A larger local 
mmufacturing sector means a greater number of varieties and a lower price index for manufactured 
goods, which are used as inputs in t,o the manufacturing process as well as for :fi.na1 COilSllliilption. 
Coupled with free entry, this works to partially offset the .effect of matket crowding on wages_ Just 
22 Note however that welfare analysis requires looking at net wages. Workers in different regions may get paid 
different net wages in tills. context. 
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1i1re in Krogman (1991), the crowding effect dontinates when transport costs Me high ".11-ttile the home 
muket and cost linkage ,effects become more Unportant for lower transport costs. 
The pl.:a:in curve in figure Sa represents the wage curve for mannfactnring in the case of high 1ransport 
costs. Consider an increase in the mamlfaotwing workforoe starting from zero employment in 
mmufaduring. Cost linkages and the home market effect fust dominate before crowding kicks in and 
lowers manufactming wages as the manufactming workforce expands. 1be equilibrium occurs at point 
A The plain curve in figure Sb represents the manufacturing wage curve for i:ntennMiate transport 
costs. In this case, the home lll3lket effect reinforced by cost linkages dominates the crowding effect 
as malll.lfucturing expands. 1bere Me now three equilibria at points B 1, B2, and B1. The equilibrium in 
B2 is unstable so that area 1 is either at B 1 while are<~~ 2 is at B3 or area 1 is at B3 while area 2 is at 
B l. Compared to At , BJ implies a larger manufacturing w0Ikforce.13 Finally the plaDl rurve in figure 
Sc represents the manufacturing wage cwve for low transport rosts. In this case, cost linkages are 
much \Veaker so that the rnamJfacturing wage cu1ve is much. flatter than in the previous case. There is 
a unique equilibrium. at C. This equilibrium implies a more even <listribution of mmufadnring than for 
mtermediate transport costs . The reason behind this is that c.onoentration of mamxfacturing in one area 
bids up the wage in that area while it dept-esses the wage in the other area.. When tr.msport costs are 
low, manufil.oturing in the core area has to ,compete with manufacturing in the peripheral area.. Since 
workers are the ~ the only soUf7ce of-wage difference arises from the costs of importing 
mtermediates and exporting output. As transport oosts decline, the wage difference between the two 
areas has to decline, which implies manufacturing moves back to the periphery . The bell-shaped effect 
of market integration is agam obtained. 
As shown by Combes, Duranton, and Gobillon (2005), wOJkers tend to sort across cities according to 
observed and tmobserved cllaracteristics. More generally, .skilled workers are over -represented in large 
cities while unskilled wOik:ers tend to live in smaller cities (Peri, 2002).1nspired by the analysis of 
Abdel-Ralumn and Wang (1997), it is possible to show how such a pattern can emerge using our 
diagrammatic framewrn:k.. 1be starting point of the analysis is to assume that workers with rugher 
skills benefit more from agglotnerdtion effects. If, for rnstanoe., agglmmration has a nmltiplicative 
·effect on individual productivity (as routinely assumed by empirical studies), the benefits from 
agglomeration will increase with skills. Gr-aphically this implies two wage curves, one for skilled 
workers and another for tmSkilled workers. This is represented in figure 6a. After taking into account 
the cost of li.ving curve, the net wage curves for these two groups of workers are r:epresented in figure 
23 Note that B3 could be to the right offue right-band-side the vertical axis, which \\rould imp·]y complete 
specialisation in manll!facfuring~ 
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6c.24 Unsurprisiogly the net wage rurve for skilled wod.rers is above that for 1.10Skilled workers. With 
both groups ofworlrers being perfectly mobile and assuming that skilled work:ers enjoy a higher 
reseiVation level, the two labour supply curves are also represented in figure 6c. 
The equilibrium is represented by points A and B for skilled and unskilled workers. It can be verified 
tmt at this equilibrium, skilled workers have no incentive to move to a smaller unskilled cdy while 
unskilled workeJ:s would enjoy a 10\"lr'e:I utility by moving to a larger skilled C-ity. Thus, sorting by skill 
is an equilibriwn outco:me. 
Chm1ges .i11 specialisatio.11 a11d the structurollra11sfo.rmatio.1t of dties 
The extension of the wban system framework proposed by Dur.mton and Puga (2005) is useful for 
tbmking about the ~formation of the very largest city economies dming the de-industrialisation 
period. This model was motivated initially by changes in the US utban system which saw cities 
sb:ifling from being predominantly spec.ialised by sector to being specialised by fi.mction (e.g. , 
production, management, etc} To model this, Duraoton and Puga (2005) use the Henderson (1974) 
fram.eworlc but allow the spatial organisation of films to be endogenous. 
Firms, in each seotor, require both sector-specific inputs (e.g., car parts for car produ.cers) as well as 
business services for their headquarters. There are agglomeration economies in all sectors including 
business services. Finns face a trade-off between spatial integration of both headquarters and 
production facilities and the spatial separation of these two fuoctions. If :fums decide to locate their 
production facilities and headquarters separately, then both parts of the operation can :fully benefit 
from the re-levant agglonleiation extemaliti.es (sector specific inputs for the production :fucdity, 
lms.iness services for the headquarters). In contrast, spatial integration allows :lions to manage the 
interaction between production facilities and headquarte.J:S more efficiently because they save on 
conummication costs between the two tmits, but this comes at the cost of more expensive inputs ro 
both parts of the operation (because of the negative reciprocal crowding that both activities genflr.lte in 
the city). 
When communication costs are high, n is very costly for :fums to spatially separate thcir headquarters 
from their produ)tion plant. Consequently the demand for labour of spatially disintegrated firms is 
low. As a result, a functionally specialised city will pay low \vages, captured by the bottom wage 
curve itn figure 7a. In particular, this v.rage curve will be below that of a city specia.lised by sector 
M We assumed that fue c,ost of living was the same for both groups. This is lDll.ikcly to hold empirically since 
skilled workers tend to consume more l.and because offueir higher wages. Howe\'er, v."ith land being a normal 
good. a higher cost ofliving fur Silrilledl wod:ers is ~ely to of'.l:irei completely the differences in w;ages:~ 
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(medium 'l.vage curve in figure 7a). However, when commwJ.ication costs are low, lt is beneficial for 
firms to spatially separate their facilities and, as a result, cities will be specialised by fimotions, 
production or business services. The advantage of functional specialisation is that headquarters 
(regardless of their sectors) 'IN'illbe able to exploit more fully the eronomies of scale in cities 
specialised in business services and management activities . For low conmnmication costs, the wage 
curve of functionally specialised ci ties is represented by the top curve in figure 7a. 
Using these wage cmves, together \vith the cost of living curve represented in figure 7b, we draw, in 
figure 7c, the net wage cwve for all three types of cities. It is clear that ftmctionally specialised cities 
are not viable for high comnmnication costs (the net \vage curve does not intersect with the labour 
supply Cl1l1le). For low communication costs, functionally specialised cl!ies are viable and the 
equilibrinm size of a city ji.mclionally specialised in management and business services when 
communication costs are low is larger than that of a city specialised by sector. 
If \"~e accept the idea that technological progress m the last 40 years has made it easier to manage 
production activities remotely (cheaper telecomnmnication, intranets, etc), we can shed some light on 
the structural ttansf'OIIllation of the economy of cities such as London, Nevi.r York or Paris. In the case 
of London, for instance, the struc1m<lltr.rnsfonmtion that took place between the 1960s and the 1990s 
c:;m be understood as a sucoessful transition from an integrated city with a pmduction structme 
·encompassing a range of mannfacturing sectors, :lll31lagement, government, and the handling of goods 
to a fimctionally specialised city concentrated in business services, management, and high-end 
government activities. In figure 7c, this corresponds to a shift from A to B . This increased 
concentration ofhigh vatue~added activities with. large agglomeration economies in London may have 
taken place to some extent at the expenses of many ctties from the rest of the country . • 1\s shown by 
Dur.mton and Puga (2005), if we assume (in line with empirical evidenre) that business services 
benefit from stronger localisation economies than other industries, business centres will benefit from 
stronger agglomeration economies l:han cities conibimng production and management and in tum the 
latter will ~ oy stronger economies of scale than purely production cities. Referring back to figure 2a, 
and holding COIIlll1Wlication costs oonstmt, one can think ofbusi:oess services as industry 2, 
production activities as iruhJstry 1 with integrated cities as a hypothetical industiy 3 with l:be net wage 
curve lying between industiy 1 and 2_ This implies that cities loosing their management funotions also 
have a lower optimal size. In the London case, this implies that the counterpart of the growth of 
London was the poptdation decline of cities in Northern Fngland. 
In a world ofped'ect mobility, this s.trnctural transformation would only imply higher wages for all 
workeJ:s because a more efficient wban organisation increases productive efficiency. In tum, with 
competitive land developers, the benefits of this increased efficiency will imply higher wages and a 
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higher reservation le\1-cl. for workers_ However. as we v..rilJ see below, in a world of :imperfect mobility 
and endogenous labour force participation, this population decline m Northern English cities may have 
had very negative implications. 
5. Pushing the framework: imperfect labour· mobility, planning r·t>gulations and labour fore.e 
pal'tidpation 
hnperfectlabour mobilit}' a11d margins of adjustme.Jtf 
As mentioned above, the ruagrammati.c framewrnk we introduce here allows us to be more general 
tbrul previous literature. A key issue that we want to addr;ess are the implications of allowing for 
imperfect labour mobility_ In figures 2 to 7, we assumed flat labour supply curves, dl!le to a perfect 
labom mobility assumption. We now move back to the case \Vhere mobility is imperfect, as drawn in 
figure LIn this figure, the only stable equilibrium ocours in the region where net \"\'<lge shows 
decreasing returns \\lith respect to city size_25 In contrast, we draw in figure Sc a steep opward sloping 
supply curve (very imperfect mobility) so that it intersects the net wage CllfVe in the region of 
increasing returns (ie_, for a la.'cl of population below tbe optinmm), giving a unique stable 
equilibrium at point A This difference has some interesting implications_ In He:ndf'Jrson (1974). the 
combination of perfect labour mobility and competitive large agents (developers) imphes all areas are 
at optimal population in long nm equilibrium In tbe absence ofiarge agents, perfect mobility alone 
leads to overpopulated areas (see figure 2)-
Wbat we sho\\' here :is that m tbe absence of large agents and \\lith barriers to perfect mobility, areas 
can be too small in equilibrium Put differently, barriers to mobility can reduce the inefficiencies 
associated with 1he absence of a market for cities_ 1bis echoes standard seoond-best results whereby 
one distortion can reduce the negative effects of another_ However, as usual, rorrecting a distortion by 
introducing another distortion may come at a cost With barriers to mobility, areas may not be able to 
exploit fully the extent of 1h.eir increasing returns_ If as suggested by the empirical literature, the ·oosts 
ofbeing too large are :rather small compared to the opportunity costs ofbeing unde:r:sized (Au and 
Henderson, 2004), limited labour mobility may have important hidden costs by preventing the 
·exploitation of agglomeration economies_ Limited labom mobility also has implications for the way in 
which tbe wban system adjusts to shocks, an issue to which vore now tum 
23 
Consider a positive prodnctivity shock i.n the area For any given level of city size, firms can now pay 
a higher wage and so the wage cmve sh:i:fts upwards. As sho\W: in figw:e 8, the new wage ,cw:ve 
implies a new net wage curve (the two dashed lines) and a new equiliDriUJlll at point B . This new 
equilibrinm iimphes higher wages, higher housing costs and a larger workforce. The magnitude of 
these effects depends on the slope of the different curves, ie., on the three key elasticities ofthe model 
(that of wages to employment, of the cost ofli.ving to population, and oflabom supply to net wages}. 
What happens to the long nm equilibriwn now depends on our assumptions about the elasticity of 
labour supply. We can identify three different possibilities . 
Hlabour is perfectly mobile, labour supply is iinfiinitely elastic and the higher net wage attracts an 
inflow of new workers up 1D1ti1 the point where net wages are again equalised across areas. The area 
experiencing the positive productivity shock ends up with a larger population, but no change in net 
wages. Put differently, a positive productivity shock \Vill be fully crowded out by an increase in the 
workforce. 26 The polar case of perfect immobility (i ,e., a vertical labour snpply cmve) implies the 
opposite: net \¥ages increase by the full amount of the productivity shock, will.le the population is 
lDlchangedY 
When the elasticity oflabour Sl!lpply is neither zero nor infinite, the situation is more complicated and 
the effect of a posifu-e productivity chmge wiD depend on the relative slope of the two rnrves: net 
wage and labour supply . We can tmke three general points. First, the higher the elasticity of labour 
supply, the greater the quantity (ie., population) response and the smaller the price (ie_, net wage) 
adjustment. Second, in the region of increasing returns for the net wage, a positive prodcctivity shock 
will be magnified and lead to an increase itn net wage that is larger than the original productivity 
shock In contrast, in the region of decreasing returns, the effect of the shock on net wage will be 
stmller than the itnitial shock Third, the elasticity of net wages in tum depends on the elasticity of 
wages (positively) and the elasticity of the cost of living (negatively). 
Ibe analysis of other location-spec-ific shocks follows <lirectly from this. For instance a cheaper c.ost of 
living has the same effect on the net wage cmve as a positive productivity shock. As shown in the 
Appendix, this analysis gener.ilises to the case of a small discrete nnmher of <lfeas. 
The analysis of common shocks is slightly more mvol\.-ed because a. productivity shock in the 
economy affects not only the wage ,curve of an area but also its labour supply curve_ Following a 
common positive prodootivity shock, the wage curve (which represents labour demand) shifts upwards 
26 This: result depends on the assumption that there are a large niiDlber of cities.. The case v.'ith a small number of 
cities is more complicated and is discussed in the Appendix.. 
27 Clearly, the assumption that cost ofliving does not depend on wages in the city is cmcial when reaching this: 
conclusion.. See om earlier ,dlscussj cm_ 
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as in the case •ex.amined above, but now the labour supply curve also shifts upwards. The final effect 
depends on how the two curves shift relative to each other_ If the shifts of the two curves are perl'ectly 
symmetric (ie._, the shock has similar effects everywhere), the shift of the wage curve will be ·exactly 
offset by that of the labour supply C!llfVe so that the new equilibrium will occur for a higher net wage 
but with the same population_ If the effects of the shock are not exactly the same everywhere:, the area 
tmy gain or lose population_ These gam and losses will be larger when labour supply is more ehsfic_ 
To see this more precisely, consider a common positive productivity shock leading to a proportional 
W.ccease in productivity_ This implies an anti-clockwise rotation of the wage curve armmd its origin in 
our figure. In tum, the net wage curve shifts upwards implying an increase in the optimal population 
size_ If the labour supply curve also shifts upwards following this co1l11llon productivity shock, \\:'e 
tmy obtain t\vo (interior) equili"bria rather than one (with. the new equilibriwn being unstable} Since 
not all areas can grow at the same time (we need to keep population constant), this implies that some 
areas \Vill lose population_ Assuming that the upward sloping labour supply curve reflects differences 
W. the willingness to migrate then the least mobile workers will be stuck in lmdet:sized areas. Put 
differe:olly, a positive roiDDIDD. productivity shock may be bad news for some areas_ 28 Such results 
·echo that ofDmanton and Puga! (2005) outlined above which relies on a decline in comnnmication 
costs between cities_ The general conchlsion we draw here is that tedmological progress, ·even though 
i.t maybe "'smooth., from a macroeconomic perspective, is likely to disrupt the urban :system and imply 
a smaller optimal number of cities. Imperfect labour mobility clearly prevents this type of adjustment 
and can lead to large wclfue losses . This type of problem may be mitigated by population growth 
(which implies a larger munber of cities). However in c:ouotries with stagnant or decreasing 
populations, these issues are likely to berome more a.oute in the future_ 29 
We c.an fina11y tum to the effects of W.tegrafu'e shocks_ For such shocks, the NEG fulme\1;rork is 
probably more appropriate for thinking through the consequences_ These extensions have been 
proposed by Tabucru. and Thisse (2002) and Murata (200.3). To model J.inrited labour mobility, they 
use a standard discrete choice framework with heterogeneous workers: all workers are potentialJy 
mobile but the costs of moving are idiosyncratic_ This case can be treated grnphically in an identical 
mmner to the amlysis in the Appendix. The main result of Tabuchi. and Thisse (2002) and :Muratl 
(2003) is that, with limited labour mobility, lower transport costs de not lead to unstable equilibria and 
catastrophic agglomeration reversing the result of Krugman (1991) that we worked through above. 
The reason behind this result is that imperfect labom mobility provides an extra <tispersion force: An 
up\1owd s lopitog labour supply curve, which gets vertical as the whole population concentrates in one 
21 Of course the same type of resullt would be obtained U: instead of a common positive productivity :iliock:, we 
would consider an improvement in commuting technology leading toll shift of the cost ofliving curve.. 
29 Again r.Using the issue of how to deaJ with fue decline of s.ome cities. See the end of Slection 4 . 
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area, implies that the labour supply cunre always cross the net vorage curve from below regan:D.ess of 
the shape of the latter (provided degenerate cases such as a vertical net wage curve are avoided)_ 
Hence the eqnilibrim:n is always interior and stable. 
Plmmiug .regulatiQlts 
Another issue that we can address using our di.aglammatic fuunework: is that of the impaot ofpl:amting 
regul<l!tions_ To keep the amlysis short and simple, let us examine the effects of a strict growth control 
policy, which forbids any further land development in a location after it hits some upper size boood_ In 
effect, this implies an upper bound for size of the local population. Figure 9a presents a standard 
upwMd-sloping wage au:ve_ The solid cwve in figure 9b represents the cost of living under growth 
control while the dashed curve repr;esents the cost of living in the absence of growth control Using 
these two Cl:ll\>-es, in figure 9c., we obtain the net wage rurve under growth control and the net wage 
au:ve without growth control (solid and dashed line respectively)_ The last curve represented in figure 
9c is the labour Sl!lpply curve_ It is simple to read off that the equihlnium. with grollirfh control is at A 
while the equihDrium without grov.1h control is at B_ 
The fust important result regMds the effects of growth control on whether cities are tmder or 
oversized_ Just like barrie£s to mobility, gmv.rfh control measures have an ambiguous efficiency effect 
in a second-best world. 1be reason is that in the absence of a mrohanism, like large agents, to 
ffilplemeot the efficient population size of an area, the area may be over -populated in equihOrium.._ In 
contTast, growth controls typically imply under -population. HoV<·ever, as highlighted before it is 
always dangerous to offset one distortion by introducing another distortion Indeed, in figure 9c the net 
wage under growth control is actually smaller than the net wage if the c.ity was oversized (compare the 
net wage :at A to the net wage at B). 
In case of a positive locat ion specific shock when growth. control is binding, note that the sole margin 
of adjustment is the cost of living_ This is beause a positive productivity shock raises wages~ In twn 
this makes the area DlOfe attractive_ 1ben, potential in-migrants bid up the price of housing_ However, 
because of growth control, the population cannot increase. Hence the adjustment is such that the net 
wage must remain constant_ This implies that the increase in housing costs completely offSets the 
increase m wages. Supportive evidence of this type of effect is given in Glaeser et al_ (2005}. 
L-abonr force participation 
We now enrich our framework to consider yet another margin of adjustment: participation in the 
labour market This margin is usually neglected in the theoretical literature, although empirically it 
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appears to play a lll.ajor role. According to Decressin and Fatas (1995), in the European Union, when a 
regi.on experience; a negative employment shock, 78% of the adjustment ooalfS through labour force 
participation in the fust year and 500/o through participation in the second year (the remaining 
adjos.tment ocrnrring tbrough uoemployment and out-migration). Figure lOa, shows how the standard 
wage curve moves when the location experiences a negative productivity shock (from the solid to the 
dashed line). Figure lOb is a standard cost of living curve. As 11SI'lal, the difference between the wage 
and the cost of living leads to the net wage rurve in figure 1 Oc. The solid bell-shaped curve is the net 
wage before the shock and the dashed bell-shaped rurve represents. the net wage after the shock. 
The main difference with the previous figures concerns the labour supply curve. 1be upward sloping 
straight line is a standard labour supply curve. With constant labour force participation, the effect of a 
negative productivity (or demand) shock is strai.gbtfOIWard Some worlrers leave the area after the 
shock and the local economy adjusts. to a lower wage and a lower local population. On the figure, the 
equili.brinm \lo'Ould shift from point A to B. 
To model the participation decision, we assume that below a certain net wage threshold, wotkers drop 
out oftbe labour fooce and rely on the welfare system instead.30 Consider again the same negative 
productivity shock, this time taking the participation constr<l!int illlto account After the :shock the 
unronstramed equilibrimn (point B) is not feasible becal!lSe before reaching poilllt B, at poilllt D, the 
local economy ruts the reservation net wage. Labour foroe participation then drops until ta:bour supply 
crosses the net wage at point C. The gap between D and C on the X-axi.s is the extent of non-
participation in the labour force. In this case, the adjustment to a negative shock implies not only 
lov;rer Vo~'<lges and out-migration but also workers dropping om of the labour force and becoming 
unemployed or claiming alternatives fOimS ofbenefits. such as disability benefits, etc. 
Note that the consequences of a negative shock could be much worse than in the case just discussed. If 
for instance, the maximum of the dashed net "\\rage rutve (the net wage CllllVe after the shock) were to 
go below the reservation level of workers, participation would then drop to zero.31 
30 Whether the participation decision is driven by the level of nominal wage or instead by the net wage i.s an 
empiric-al question. In countries where unemployed workers are likely to receive housing subsidies as welll as 
unemployment benefits in cash like the UK, it is utm:al to assume that participation is driven by net wages. 
31 When the la.bom supply curve intersec~s the ne-~ ~onge curve in the region of increasing returns, some dnmatic 
c.on.seqnences are also possible. In part;icul.n, rt may again be the case fuat, after a shock, the labour supply cm:ve 
no longer has any intersection with the net ~onge cmve. This would again lead the l.abour force participation to 
drop to zero. This case is partioularly inefficient because a less steep labom supply line (i.e.., more labour 
mobility) can imply another equilibrium with full labour fOrce p:uticipation. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper develops a diagr.m:umti.c framework to analyse the spatial economy and how lt adjusts to 
shocks_ 1bis fr.unev.'Oik allows a clear comparison betv."eeel the core models of the Ulban systems 
approa-ch and NEG. Existing extensions of these models can also be studied within the same 
framework Beyond this our diagrammatic framewodr. leods tt:self well to a number of policy-oriented 
·extensions_ In particular, we consider the implications of impelfect labour mobility, local (land) supply 
regul<l!tions, and labour force participation decisions, issues that are seldom. studied in the existing 
literature_ Fw1her policy extensions to be dealt with in future work regard other spatial policies such as 
regional subsidies, the tmcati.on of agglomeration rents, etc (see BaJdwin et aL, 2003, for an cmalytic 
t:reatment in an NEG framewmk)-
From a theoretical perspective, a weakness of our approach is t.oo.t we still look at urban systems and 
NEG models separately whereas one of om conclusions is that these two approaches should be looked 
at together: NEG is preoccupied volith broad spatial trends whereas the tuban system hteratur:e is 
concerned with spikes in the economic Jaodscape_ The tvm are nmtually dependent but a full analysis 
of their j oint implications must waiil: for another tilme. 
Our results lDlderscore the :importance of three key relations_ The importance of the relation between 
local employment and local wages has been aoknowledged for a long time and much is known about it 
both theoretically and empmcaJly. The issues surrounding the rost of living are well understood 
theoretically but empirically estimating the cost of living CUIVe has proved elusive_ Fmatly, we also 
showed that tbe local labour supply was a fhndamental determinant of the way in v;fti-ch areas adjust to 
shocks. Much still needs to be learnt about local labour supply , both theoretically and empirically. We 
hope future wod: will address these issues . 
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Appe11di:.t.:: Int.e.raclions amo.ng a smallmmtber of areas m 1der imperfect labour mobilit)' 
It is possible to generalise the analysis of shocks under imperfect mobility to aacount for the possible 
interactions among a small number of areas_ This extens:ion i.s partirularly relevant when migration 
flows are mostly short distance. The concave upward sloping curve in figure Al represents the net 
wage for area L It can be derived m exactly the same fuhion as before from a wage cmve and a cost 
of living curve. which we omit for simplicity_ 'The second important curve .in the figure is the net wage 
C111Ve for area. 2 (a thinner curve that mirrors the net 1.vage curve for area ])_Assuming that the total 
population of the two areas is constantc, this net wage curve shows directly the wage in area 2 for any 
level of population m area l_ Under perfect mobility, the equ.ihbrium would imply the equalisation of 
net wages in the two areas at point A (wruch incidentally would be l!mS!able since the intersection is in 
the regi.on of increasing returns} With imperfect labour mobility, the Sl!lpply of labour in area 1 is 
represented by the convex upward sloping curve in the figure_ It intersects the net wage curve of area 1 
at point A'_ Note that trus equilibrium implies a larger population in area l _ A possible reason behind 
this could be the following_ In the region of increasing returns, there are forces pushing towards the 
concentration oftbe entire population in one area_ However, wotkers may have personal preferences 
for one or the other area These locational preferences imply a convex labour supply ourve as in the 
figure and the workers staying in area 2 are those with strong preferences for this area_ 
Consider now a positive productivity shock in area l Thi.s productivity shock implies an upward shift 
of the net wage cmve in the figure (the concave dashed curve)_ If the labour supply rnrve was 
determined only by the net wage in area 1, the new equihbriwn would be found at point B_ However, 
d is more reasonable to expect migration to be driven by the differential in net ·wages tather than the 
net wage at destination only_ Consequently, we expect the productivity shock to shift the labour supply 
curve as well, although this shift will be downwards not upwards, which gives the dashed convex. 
curve. This is because for any level of population in area 1, the difference in wages between the two 
areas i.s rugher after the shock 
The shift of the net wage curve of area 1 between A' and C now implies that the post~shock gap in net 
wages for the pre--shock population levels is represented by the segrrent C - C' (instead ofC- A' 
before the shock)_ With C' - D' running paraHel to C - D, the new gap in net wages can be 
represented by D - D' _ Such a difference in net wages would have implied an equilibrium in D' before 
the shock Put differently, aside from a shift in the net v.rage Cii.1!Ve, the shock also implies a labour 
supply curve shift from A, to D' _ The new equilibrium after the shock is then represented by pointE 
To su.mrnruise, a positive productivity shock in an area has two effects_ There is a direct effect making 
the area more attractive in absolute terms_ With a large nmnber of areas (and no area being able to 
affect the national equilibrium), the adjustment would stop here. However, with a small number of 
areas, for any level of population an increase in the attractiverrss of an area implies a larger difference 
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